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Failed securitization: Why it matters 
Jan Ruzicka 
 
Abstract: 
The puzzle driving this article is the near unanimous focus in the literature 
on successful cases of securitization. The article examines this case 
selection bias and asks about its consequences for the study of security. 
Three arguments are offered. First, there is no reason to a priori give 
preference to successful cases and a full range of outcomes should be 
explored. Second, paying attention to failed cases of securitization might 
hold important insights for the processes of securitization as well as 
desecuritization. Third, taking failed cases seriously can put into broader 
perspective actors’ ability to use claims about security to accrue power and 
advance their political agendas. In short, moving away from the fixation on 
successful cases of securitization will give us a fuller understanding of what 
security is and what it does. 
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Nothing succeeds like success. One could hardly choose a better saying to 
pithily summarize the direction that the study of securitization has taken 
over the past two decades. Researchers have delivered case upon a case of 
successful instances where actors have managed to securitize a specific 
issue within a particular context. Any overview of the fast growing literature 
must lead to an indisputable conclusion that the securitization scholarship 
has focused almost exclusively on those instances where securitization did 
happen.1 One hardly ever encounters a failed case of securitization. And 
even the few notable exceptions devoted to failed securitization are written 
with either a very specific notion of failure or are based on the premise that 
what makes them of interest is the lack of success rather than the failure 
per se.2   
The empirical observation about the overwhelming one-sidedness of the 
studies using securitization theory provides for the initial puzzle 
underpinning this article. While it shows some of the sources of this 
direction in the original formulation of the theory, it is ultimately beyond the 
scope of this article to explain the undoubtedly numerous and varied 
motivations of many scholars. The article is therefore less concerned with 
the question why there has been the bias towards the successful cases, than 
with the question of how the bias has affected the study of securitization. 
In response to this question, I put forward three interconnected arguments. 
First, the possible reasons to prefer the successful cases are not convincing 
and researchers should examine the entire spectrum of outcomes of 
securitizing moves. Second, the case selection bias dominating the 
securitization literature makes it difficult to understand why some, or 
perhaps even most (it is impossible to tell, because we have no systematic 
data) securitizing moves fail. Finally, paying attention to securitization 
failures provides a useful corrective to the impression, created by the 
emphasis on successful cases, that political actors can appropriate power 
more easily when invoking security. Each of these arguments has important 
implications not only for the study of securitization, its logics and processes, 
but also for the study of security as a key political value and concept.  
Studying cases of failed securitization promises important heuristic gains. 
Failed cases can provide a firmer understanding of why some securitizing 
moves succeed while others do not. Speech acts are not created equal. Who 
expresses them and under what conditions, whom they are addressed to, 
the issues they concern, the forms that are used in their delivery, metaphors 
they incorporate, historical connotations on which they draw all matter and, 
crucially, differ from case to case and across time and space. The preference 
for successful cases has mutilated this fascinating variety of factors mostly 
to actors typically revolving around the state. That is hardly representative 
of instances where security is spoken. By orienting attention to a fuller 
range of factors, the actual processes of security construction, rather than 
                                       
1 For a comprehensive overview of the literature see Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Leonard and 
Jan Ruzicka, “Securitization Revisited: Theory and Cases,” International Relations 30, no. 4 
(2016): 494-531.   
2 See Kristian Atland and Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “When Security Speech Acts Misfire: 
Russia and the Elektron Incident,” Security Dialogue 40, no. 3 (2009): 333-354; Matt 
McDonald, “The Failed Securitization of Climate Change in Australia,” Australian Journal of 
Political Science 47, no. 4 (2012): 579-592; Mark B. Salter, “When Securitization Fails: The 
Hard Case of Counter-Terrorism Programs” in Securitization Theory: How Security Problems 
Emerge and Dissolve, ed. Thierry Balzacq (London: Routledge, 2011), 116-131.  
actors’ pronouncements, will become more prominent. Because of this, new 
research questions can be asked. For instance, can a failure of a securitizing 
move pave way for its eventual successful securitization? What changed so 
that a different result ensued? What is processually and contextually 
different to explain the variation in outcomes? Why are some important 
issues persistently resistant to being treated as security issues? Answers to 
all of these questions will be better informed, if they draw on failed cases of 
securitization. 
The Preference for Success 
 
One of the chief reasons for the rapid spread of securitization theory in the 
field of security studies has been its ability to shift scholars’ focus. As an 
outgrowth of the wider dissatisfaction with the state of the field since the 
1980s, which manifested itself in the debates about the meaning and scope 
of security, the theory offered an appealing new direction. Rather than 
concentrating on the question “What is security?” it encouraged researchers 
to look at the question “What security does?”.3  
 
This change of emphasis towards performative effects of security is in line 
with the two broader philosophical sources underpinning the theory – J. L. 
Austin’s theory of speech acts and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political.4 
Securitization’s originators prominently acknowledged the former –“the 
process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act.”5 
It was up to others to note the undertones of the Schmittian legacy of 
existential threats – “security is not just any kind of speech act (…) it is 
casting of the issue as one of an existential threat.”6 From the start then, the 
theory has pointed towards the following direction: the doing of existential 
threats.  
 
In practical terms, i.e. which processes ought to be examined, what this 
meant was clear. As Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde wrote in their seminal 
book, “security analysis is interested mainly in successful instances of 
securitization.”7 Why? Because such cases “constitute the currently valid 
specific meaning of security.”8 In other words, if one wants to observe and 
analyse what happens when the word security is uttered (i.e. what security 
does), one must study the cases when it works and actually has some 
effects. The preference for successful cases was therefore built into the 
                                       
3 The key reference points are Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization” in On 
Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46-86; 
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 
4 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); 
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).  
5 Buzan et. al, Security, 26.         
6 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” 
International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003): 511-531, at 514. 
7 Buzan et. al, Security, 39. 
8 Buzan et. al, Security, 39. 
theory from the beginning. Without it, so the originators must have thought, 
the theory could not have lived up to their overarching objective.   
 
That the preference for success is not an uncontentious choice is suggested 
by the way they ruled out unsuccessful cases. These they deemed of interest 
“for the insights they offer into the stability of social attitudes toward 
security legitimacy, the process by which those attitudes are maintained or 
changed, and the possible future direction of security politics.”9 In some 
ways, the proposition sounds plausible enough. Rejecting a securitizing 
move, which is one possible meaning of an unsuccessful case, may indeed 
reflect the prevailing social (and obviously political) attitudes toward security 
legitimacy in a given context.  
 
However, it is not at all clear why the study of security should limit itself to 
such attitudes. If that were to happen, we would learn something about 
them and perhaps about legitimacy, but not about security. A good 
illustration of potential shortcomings such approach entails is Lene 
Hansen’s critique of securitization theory.10 Hansen demonstrated how the 
absence of gender in the theory means that it is entirely incapable of paying 
attention to those instances where threatened individuals simply cannot 
voice their security concerns out of fear that their precarious lives would 
have become even more endangered. Ken Booth put a similar point more 
concisely: “If security is always a speech act, insecurity is frequently a 
zipped lip.”11 While Hansen and Booth do not invoke the distinction between 
successful and unsuccessful cases of securitization, it is implied in their 
arguments. Had they worked with it explicitly, they would have had another 
line of attack against the securitization theory. They would have been able to 
show how Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde’s pre-emptively offered argument 
against such normative criticisms, namely that their perspective “basically 
removes the objective ground from the dominant discourse,”12 rests on the 
preference for successful cases of securitization.   
 
In addition to the normative problems raised by the preference for success, 
the neglect of unsuccessful cases is exacerbated by the lack of any 
indication what such cases might look like. What exactly is it that 
securitization theory ought not to concentrate upon? Are unsuccessful cases 
the aforementioned instances when securitizing moves get rejected or do 
they entail a much greater variety of cases? These questions are apparent in 
articles highlighting the geographically or thematically narrow confines of 
securitization theory, such as those presented by Claire Wilkinson or Matt 
McDonald.13 Are the weaknesses they point out (respectively, the 
                                       
9 Buzan et. al, Security, 39. 
10 Lene Hansen, “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender 
in the Copenhagen School,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2000): 
285-306.   
11 Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 168. 
12 Buzan et. al, Security, 40. 
13 Claire Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization 
Theory Useable Outside Europe?,” Security Dialogue 38, no. 1 (2007): 5-25; McDonald, “The 
Failed Securitization of Climate Change in Australia.” 
Westphalian straightjacket and mobilizing around climate change) features 
inherent to the theory or to the type of cases it prefers? These questions also 
arise in Kristian Atland and Kristin Ven Bruusgaard’s article which aims to 
explicitly contribute to the understanding of failed cases of securitization.14 
Atland and Ven Bruusgaard delivered a fine analysis of a single incident 
involving Norway and Russia where the puzzle was the absence of 
successful securitization despite the articulation of securitizing moves. 
Careful to avoid claiming that the incident should have led to securitization, 
they proposed as the key reason for the outcome “the securitizing actors’ 
lack of social capital.”15 Plausible though such an explanation appears to be, 
it clearly cannot cover the whole range of failed cases of securitization.  
 
With these opening critical remarks in mind, the preference for successful 
cases becomes dubious. How to explain those instances where actors with 
abundance of social capital make securitizing moves, yet these do not lead 
to successful securitization? Take, as an example, the security concerns 
articulated in the United Kingdom as a decrepit Russian fleet sailed down 
the English Channel in October 2016. Despite extensive press coverage and 
debate, they ultimately amounted to very little. Think about cases where one 
might have expected swift securitization, such as when the United States hit 
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 air campaign against 
Serbia. Except it did not happen. What then? We don’t know, because 
scholars have simply avoided looking into unsuccessful cases. Whatever the 
reasons for this outcome (we can only speculate whether it reflects scholars’ 
fascination with power, blind following of role-models, lack of inventiveness, 
or something else), it has shaped profoundly the way in which securitization 
has been studied. By doing so, securitization research has also abdicated on 
a whole range of fascinating cases where securitizing moves might have 
appeared in the past, but no longer do (e.g. the Franco-German 
relationship). In the following sections the article shows that such a choice 
produces specific results and raises further questions about the theory and 
its general direction. 
 
Case selection bias 
 
The stated preference for successful cases raises methodological and 
epistemological questions. Methodologically, it boils down to a plain instance 
of case selection bias. To think that to learn about something (say security), 
it is sufficient, let alone desirable, to study the cases where that something 
occurred, not only unreasonably privileges particular cases, but also poses 
the risk that we might miss important dimensions of what we want to study. 
Simply put, case selection bias refers to a process of choosing cases based 
on their outcome or, in a particular methodological language, the dependent 
variable. There is no better way to sum it up than with the title of Barbara 
                                       
14 Atland and Ven Bruusgaard, “When Security Speech Acts Misfire.” 
15 Atland and Ven Bruusgaard, “When Security Speech Acts Misfire,” 348 (emphasis in the 
original). 
Geddes’ article: “How the cases you choose affect the answers you get.”16 
When this happens, Geddes points out, proposed causal claims cannot be 
substantiated, because it is possible that the same causes did not lead to 
the same results in other cases. 
 
Applying securitization theory only to successful cases produces similarly 
questionable results. Cases of securitization are typically not chosen, for 
example, based on the variety of securitizing moves or conditions under 
which they are articulated (both such options could be considered 
independent variables), but on the basis of the outcome, that is successful 
securitization (i.e. the dependent variable). This approach has produced 
tremendous wealth of single case studies and individual illustrations of 
securitization.17 Not surprisingly, however, it has led to little in terms of 
cross-case comparison. In this regard, it is not without coincidence that the 
problem of case selection bias has been most closely examined in the field of 
comparative politics/sociology. The study of securitization would do well to 
heed the lessons learned by comparativists. It would open space not only for 
failed cases, but also for experiments, as well as counterfactuals, all of 
which, thus far, have been ruled out a priori by securitization theory.18 
 
Epistemologically, there is no reason to accept the claim that to know 
something about “the currently valid specific meaning of security” we should 
only examine successful cases. When a securitizing move is rejected and 
therefore fails, we probably will learn something about the meaning of 
security at that particular point for at least two reasons. First, since 
securitization theory is conceived of as intersubjective (it presupposes 
interaction between the securitizing actor, other actors, and the relevant 
audience which is addressed by the securitizing actor) it must incorporate 
space for counter-claims. Those voicing opposition to the securitizing moves 
must have some grounds on which they resist. Their refusal to accept a 
securitizing move will likely, though not necessarily, entail some sort of the 
following statements: “What is proposed is not a security issue at all”; “The 
real security issue is so and so”; “Other security issues have to take 
precedence, because there are only limited resources for dealing with 
them”.19 Such statements could be seen as part of a competing process of 
securitization and hence constitute an alternative case of successful 
securitization, thus confirming the theory’s preference. However, they may 
simply rearticulate what have long been established meanings of security. 
Finally, they may just as well amount to nothing as far as successful 
                                       
16 Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias 
in Comparative Politics,” Political Analysis 2, no. 1 (1990): 131-150. See also Barbara 
Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative 
Politics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003), especially chapter 3. 
17 Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka, “Securitization Revisited.” 
18 A step in this direction is Stephane J. Baele and Catarina P. Thomson, “An Experimental 
Agenda for Securitization Theory,” International Studies Review 19, no. 4 (2017): 646-666. 
On the possible uses of counterfactuals see Richard Ned Lebow, Forbidden Fruit: 
Counterfactuals and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
19 There is, obviously, the possibility that they will argue ad hominem, saying nothing about 
security and simply dismiss their opponents as ignorant, idealistic, incompetent, etc.  
securitization is concerned and serve merely as negative statements 
preventing the success of their competitors. Without studying unsuccessful 
cases, we are unlikely to find out. 
 
The other reason why unsuccessful cases should be of interest when trying 
to understand the meaning of security has to do with the process of its 
construction. Whether the potential failure of a securitizing move has to do 
with what an actor proclaims and/or their social standing and capital, 
hinges upon the strength of alternative meanings of security, or comes as 
result of not managing the process of security construction appropriately to 
given conditions is, ultimately, an empirical question. The way in which 
newer articulations of securitization theory have stressed its processual 
dimension recognizes this issue more than the original statement by Buzan, 
Weaver and de Wilde.20 The argument in favour of paying closer attention to 
processes is based on the premise that the meaning of security cannot be 
divorced from the process through which it has been produced.    
 
Crucial to this argument is to understand securitization theory as a causal 
theory, i.e. as a theory, which identifies conditions and factors that lead to a 
certain result, namely the establishment of issues as security issues.21 The 
knowledge how this happened in specific instances is gained by the tracing 
of processes when actors try to turn issues into security issues. This I take 
to mean the knowledge generated by asking questions such as: What has 
caused an issue X to become a security issue?, and/or How has an issue X 
become a security issue? Both questions ask about causes of a particular 
end result.    
 
Securitization theory’s initial causal proposition is the following: 
securitization happens when a securitizing move, which is an existential 
threat presented by an actor (typically with a privileged social standing) 
gains acceptance of a relevant audience for the breaking of otherwise 
binding rules.22 Stefano Guzzini has re-articulated this pathway more fully 
and with greater precision as a causal mechanism: 
  
a process in which (de)securitization can only be understood against 
the background of existing foreign policy discourses, their embedded 
collective memory of past lessons, defining metaphors and the 
significant “circles of recognition” for the collective identities of a 
country; and whose success does obviously depend on, but cannot be 
reduced to, the distribution of authority and different forms of capital 
in the relevant field. Its effectiveness (just as with a law) is historically 
constituted and evolving.23 
                                       
20 See Thierry Balzacq, ed., Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and 
Dissolve (London: Routledge, 2011); Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka, “Securitization 
Revisited,” 496-8 and 517-521.  
21 See also Stefano Guzzini, “Securitization as A Causal Mechanism,” Security Dialogue 42, 
no. 4-5 (2011): 329-341.  
22 Buzan et. al, Security, 23-26. 
23 Guzzini, “Securitization as A Causal Mechanism,” 336. 
 
For either the causal proposition or mechanism to be meaningful, there has 
to exist the possibility of failure. If they were to always lead to a successful 
outcome, the result would merely depend on the ability of actors to follow a 
given recipe. There would be no room for any other actors to influence the 
outcome. Nor would there be much of a role for the relevant audience to 
influence the process of security construction. On the one hand, the 
audience might not come into play at all and be simply ignored, because its 
role is important only in so far as the approval of an audience is demanded 
by the existing rules. On the other hand, there might be no rules to break, 
which applies especially to situations when political or social communities 
are undergoing a rapid and fundamental change or disintegration, and the 
process of securitization is aimed at creating a new set of binding rules.  
 
Why some processes fail 
 
The case selection bias has an additional processual dimension. Put very 
simply, to privilege successful cases (and hence outcomes in general) must 
lead to a rather impoverished understanding of failed processes of 
securitization. In the context of focusing on what security does, this would 
seem a banal point, a loss that might well be acceptable as the cost of doing 
business. There is a catch, however. Given the theory’s clearly articulated 
normative preference for desecuritization, can it really afford to write off 
those cases that might hold cues to how desecuritization could come 
about?24 Should we not want to know more about what a failure looks like 
and, more importantly, about the process that brings it about? So long as 
the normative preference for desecuritization holds, these should be 
important questions for those working with the theory.  
 
Asking why a securitizing move did not succeed shifts the analytical 
emphasis from outcomes back to processes, specifically to the question how 
it came about that invoking security did not produce the desired/expected 
results. The inversion of criteria characterizing successful cases of 
securitization suggests several reasons why a securitizing move might fail. 
First, an actor presenting a securitizing move does not know how to speak 
security in a given context. In Salem, Massachusetts, accusations about the 
existential threat posed by witchcraft will produce radically different results 
today, than they did at the end of the seventeenth century. Second, the 
actors may not possess sufficient authority/social capital vis-à-vis the 
relevant audience, as Atland and Ven Bruusgaard conclude in their article 
about Norway and Russia.25 Third, what is presented as a threatening object 
is not amenable to securitization. President Obama may have received Nobel 
Peace Prize for his call for the abolition of nuclear weapons, because of the 
existential threat they pose to the life on the planet, but he also oversaw a 
massive upgrade of the United States’ nuclear arsenal as a necessary 
security policy. Fourth, the relevant audience may refuse to accept a 
                                       
24 See also Mark B. Salter, “When Securitization Fails.” 
25 Atland and Ven Bruusgaard, “When Security Speech Acts Misfire.” 
securitizing move. In 2014, the Ebola virus epidemic in Liberia was aided by 
the fact that “many ordinary Liberians were so profoundly estranged from 
their government that they assumed it was lying to them and actively 
disbelieved the warnings.”26 A failure can come about as a result of any of 
these reasons alone or through their various combinations. Undoubtedly, 
there will be additional causes which studies of unsuccessful securitization 
can help to uncover.  
 
The key conclusion is that especially the third and the fourth reason 
undermine the idea that the “currently valid specific meaning of security” 
can be established on the basis of studying successful cases alone. These 
two reasons point towards variation in the processes of security 
construction that securitization theory has mostly overlooked. On the 
contrary, the preference for successful cases goes hand in hand not only 
with privileging a specific type of process, but also some of its constitutive 
features, which, in turn, diminish the processual dimension of 
securitization. This characteristic is most apparent with regard to political 
decisions, the Schmittian undercurrent of the theory. Ole Wæver, clarifying 
elements of the theory on his own, expressed this quite unambiguously 
when he wrote that “even very important conditions for successful 
securitization can never replace the political act as such.”27 Well aware that 
this brings the theory perhaps too close to Schmitt’s decisionist logic of the 
political, Wæver attempted to create some distance from it by invoking the 
intersubjective nature of securitization.28  
 
Whether Wæver’s move to shield the theory is persuasive or not goes beyond 
the scope of this article.29 The argument here merely is that the need to 
distance the theory from Schmitt arises not necessarily from the theory’s 
logic (which, indeed, is intersubjective), but actually from the misguided 
preference given to successful cases. It is the overwhelming focus on such 
cases that highlights decisions more than processes.   
 
The shift from processes to decisions and outcomes is quite ironic, given 
that one of securitization theory’s main ambitions was “not to assess some 
objective threats that ‘really’ endanger some object to be defended or 
secured; rather it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared 
                                       
26 Helen Epstein, “Ebola in Liberia: An Epidemic of Rumors,” The New York Review of Books 
61, (December 18, 2014): 91-95, at 91.  
27 Ole Wæver, “The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on 
Post-sovereign Security Orders,” in International Relations Theory and the Politics of 
European Integration: Power, Security and Community, ed. Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. 
Williams (London: Routledge, 2000), 250-294, at 252. For an example of work that casts 
doubt on the primary importance of the political act in securitization see Thierry Balzacq, 
“The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 46, no. 1 (2008): 75-100. 
28 Wæver, “The EU as a Security Actor,” 252 and footnote 5. 
29 However, its limits appear when one considers the following possibility. Suppose that a 
socially and politically powerful actor follows the grammar of security, but fails to succeed 
in securitizing a given issue. How else but by recourse to circumstances does one explain 
that outcome? 
understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a 
threat.”30 It should be clear from the above that such a goal is better served 
by analysing both successful and failed cases of securitization. 
 
What does security actually do? 
 
There can be little doubt that among the three main “schools” of critical 
security studies, which originated in the post-Cold War Europe 
(Aberystwyth, Copenhagen, Paris), securitization theory espoused by the 
Copenhagen School has produced the largest quantity of empirical 
research.31 Unlike the other two alternatives, it is straightforward in its 
operationalization and because of the emphasis on discourses does not 
require painstaking institutional, archival, or field-based work.  
 
Adding to the allure of securitization theory are two more factors. One 
derives from the way in which it taps into the pervasive sense that to get 
anything done politically actors are at an advantage when they invoke 
security. In securitization theory this manifests itself in the aforementioned 
prominence given to actors’ political acts. The other factor is connected to 
the underlying suspicion, which sometimes borders on certainty, that 
security allows actors to mask actions of dubious nature, gain various 
difficult-to-attain advantages, and ultimately increase their own power. In 
the theory this is expressed by the element of breaking free of otherwise 
binding rules that co-defines a successful case of securitization. Thanks to 
these two factors securitization theory seems eminently plausible. Actors do 
make claims using the label of security often and in the most unexpected 
circumstances. They also fall back on security when trying to cover up 
problems and gain greater power. In short, pronouncements invoking 
security seem omnipresent.  
 
All this would suggest that to better understand what security does 
amounts to conducting critical analysis. Paradoxically, however, rather than 
helping the theory these factors undermine its critical potential, especially if 
it immerses itself exclusively in successful cases. If it is indeed true, and 
that is an empirical question requiring robust data collection and analysis, 
that numerous actors invoke security to have their preferred issues taken 
seriously, we should be wary of the power of security to do things. As a 
hunch, it does not seem very plausible that all of these actors will succeed 
with their security-laden agendas. While some of their failures can certainly 
be chalked up to actors’ properties and/or their limited ability to use 
security to reach the goals they want to realize, it is unlikely that this could 
cover all the possible failed cases.  
  
What the field of security studies may well be dealing with when it comes to 
securitization with its preference for successful cases is a phenomenon 
                                       
30 Buzan, et al, Security, 26. 
31 For an overview of these approaches see C.A.S.E. Collective, “Critical Approaches to 
Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 4 (2006): 443-487. 
known in cognitive psychology as frequency illusion.32 This type of cognitive 
bias describes situations where either memorable or newly learned 
information is perceived as occurring more frequently than it objectively 
does. Richard Galbraith and Benton Underwood demonstrated this illusion 
using texts containing the same count of abstract and concrete words, yet 
where the former were perceived as more numerous. Examples of the 
frequency illusion in our daily lives are commonplace and require only 
modest introspection. For example, parents of a new-born child with Down’s 
Syndrome will start noticing everywhere people with Down’s Syndrome 
whom they hardly registered before.  
 
Securitization theory’s alertness to the powerful effects of the use of 
security, amplified by the preference for successful cases, could have 
produced findings that are driven precisely by frequency illusion. It is, of 
course, possible that they are not. The point is that at this stage and with 
the findings generated by the theory we cannot tell one way or the other. 
Without systematic treatment of securitizing moves irrespective of whether 
they produce successful or unsuccessful cases it is actually impossible to 
say with a solid degree of confidence what security does. There are too many 
important issues, climate change or nuclear weapons to use just two 
prominent examples, where securitizing moves have been failing for decades. 
Such failures need to be somehow accounted for and the preference for 
successful cases does not do that. Similarly, it may also be the case that 
because of frequency illusion studies using securitization theory have 
tended to overestimate the power of elites when doing security. This, of 
course, is at the heart of the frontal critique launched against the theory by 
Ken Booth and his approach to security as emancipation that need not, or 
perhaps even cannot, be driven by elites.33    
 
All this uncertainty about findings generated by securitization theory 
skewed towards successful cases and their potential ambiguity should alert 
us to a bigger argument concerning the question of what security does. 
What does it do actually? While securitization theory deserves some credit 
for giving this question its prominence, it has not taken us very far in 
answering it. To use the label of security with the expectation that, thanks 
to its unique properties, it will produce a favourable outcome for an actor 
wielding it, there has got to be a pre-agreed understanding that this 
particular concept should carry a disproportionate causal weight. In other 
words, its power is not derived from any “currently valid meaning of 
security” that any given actor might be pushing at a specific point in time. 
Instead, it is the meaning of security that surpasses that given moment, a 
meaning which can in some contexts (but not in others since security has 
not always been a dominant political value) enable actors to invoke its 
                                       
32 Richard C. Galbraith and Benton J. Underwood, “Perceived Frequency of Concrete and 
Abstract Words,” Memory&Cognition 1, no. 1 (1973): 56-60; Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability,” in Judgment 
under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos 
Tversky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 163-178. 
33 Booth, Theory of World Security. 
powerful appeal. Quite what that meaning is transcends a single type of case 
and must involve both successful and unsuccessful instances of 
securitization.  
 
The arguments presented in this article have questioned the desirability – 
theoretical, empirical, and normative – of the preference for successful cases 
of securitization. The case selection bias leaves us with both an 
impoverished understanding of security and of its effects in various political 
and social settings. Analysing a whole range of outcomes of securitizing 
moves (including instances where there might have been good reasons to 
think that such moves would appear, yet they did not) would produce a 
more nuanced grasp of what and under what circumstances invoking 
security can or cannot do. This invitation to conduct far more robust and 
systematic inquiries into what security does promises to yield better insights 
about its workings than simply following the convenient path leading to 
predictable results. 
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